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Integrating the EU International Approach:  Complexity, Flexibility and Responsibility 
 
  At most, other countries in the world view the EU as a selective and inconsistent 
“soft power” actor that often cannot reach a consensus even for this application of power.  
At least, especially in circles in the United States that focus almost exclusively on the 
“military” War on Terror, the EU is seen as a non-actor.  This paper maintains that the 
EU role is under-valued for many reasons.  Much of the work the EU does in 
international relations is behind-the-scenes in “contact” and other informal groups.  Other 
joint actions it takes may not be directly attributable to the EU because the mode of 
cooperation may be played outside this framework, for example, the EU in NATO, in the 
United Nations, in transatlantic relations and other contexts. 
  Furthermore, this paper maintains that the EU is a significant actor, and its 
significance is growing as security threats take new forms.  The complexity afforded the 
by EU institutional set-up and the diverse membership—not to mention the 
understanding on the part of Europeans that complex solutions are the only ones 
appropriate to changing global circumstances—puts the EU in an advantageous position 
to confront dangers and conditions of instability in the world.  Flexibility provides the EU 
with a toolbox:  with various options for pulling together “coalitions of the willing” and 
“committees of the willing”.  In addition, flexibility enables the EU to negotiate a multi-
polar world and utilize multi-tiered decision-making.  Finally, responsibility for global 
problem-solving must be consciously assumed by the EU as a way to improve its 
legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens, majorities of whom express support in their 
countries for the development of European foreign policy and security policies.   
Responsibility also requires the EU to extend the internal lessons it has learned, in terms 
of peace-building and democracy.  Finally, the EU has a responsibility in transatlantic 
relations to stand for its values and to put forth its view of the world.  This responsibility 
is especially pressing as the United Sates is intent on enacting its view of the world and 
as competing views of the EU and United States have dislodged the anchor of 
transatlantic relations.  Biscop summarizes a major conceptual difference: 
 
Clearly the EU and US view the world differently.  In the words of a 
European diplomat: for the US, the world is dangerous—for the EU, the 
world is complex.
i
 
Complexity: Specialization and Networking 
 
  If one harks back to the European Coal and Steel Community, its institutions were 
intended to create a situation of interdependence among member countries.  Engagement 
instead of conflict was the intention of the founder, Jean Monnet.  The now legendary “concrete achievements” (the way in which Europe would be built) that were begun with 
the Schuman Declaration were intended not only as stepping stones to a higher political 
end but an overlapping construction that would eventually interlock states in a variety of 
tasks.  It was, thus, declared over a half-century ago: 
 
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any 
war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible. 
 
  Throughout the 1960s the situation of interdependence impressed itself on 
international relations.  World leaders began to meet with each other more regularly 
needing to adapt to a changing international environment, the biggest change being that 
domestic decisions could not longer be made without reference to international events 
and politics.  As the Council of Minsiters became more sectorized, meeting in various 
specialized formations, heads of government made their entrée into “Community” affairs 
in 1975.  The decision to form the European Council, as these meetings came to be 
called, was politically motivated, top leaders wanting to do their parts on the international 
stage.  However, the advent of the European Council was as much an adaptation to 
interdependence as it was a “high” political staging event.  Bulmer and Wessels realized  
the extent to which interdependence caught countries without the tools to manage the 
new international situation. 
  Fast-forward into the new century, and the evolution of the Council of Ministers 
could not have been only the product of design; its complex specialization can only be 
the result of accumulated experience from European integration, but also experience 
accumulated from twenty-seven governments and their particular political histories.  
Globalization has now replaced interdependence as the situation that requires new means 
of coping.  As much as governments around the world try to reduce bureaucracies, de-
regulate and strive for more transparency, the EU among them, governments are not 
becoming less bureaucratic nor easier for publics to understand.  Europeans leaders have 
previously complained about the complexities of U.S. government when policies got 
bogged down at various levels, pigeonholed in some congressional committee or worse.  
Now EU-27 vies with the United States in terms of multi-tiered decision-making and 
diversity of decisional authorities.  The vagaries and minutiae of Coreper I and II have to 
be explained to people concerned with EU decision-making.  Publics in both regions of 
the world seem to be confounded, giving their politicians low marks. 
In the United States, given a favorable political context, an extremely powerful 
executive can potentially cut through congressional delays and whip bureaucracies into 
shape, not to mention taking the fight to rogue states. The image comes to mind of 
President Bush as an action figure who possesses special powers to get his way.  
Europeans also have a caricature for the American president, that of a cowboy.  It is 
“safe” to say that the EU does not have the equivalent office.  However, it is more 
interesting to consider whether the complex system the EU has in place that requires 
constant bargaining, compromise and negotiation is one that serves a unique purpose. It is 
also worth considering that the complex specialization the EU has institutionalized makes 
it especially functional for the post-September 11 security environment, or for that 
matter, security situations that pose complex threats.  The EU poses a fascinating model as a network that can be activated to do the 
complex tasks that are involved in contemporary security, whether the challenge is 
accounting for and securing nuclear material or countering terrorism through law 
enforcement, intelligence sharing and capacity building in “failed states”, one of the EU’s 
most promising contributions is that it is conditioned to respond to “networked” threats. 
  As an organization constructed on complicated transnational links throughout the 
EU and with Third countries, not to mention links with international and non-
governmental organizations, the EU exists amidst a variety of ties that bind, ranging from 
informal to legal ones.  Like the terrorists or other international criminals, the modus 
operandi of EU is networking.  Scholars have long commented on the “density” of the 
EU owing to the myriad of officials and politicians caught up in its workings, the 
frequency of their interactions, and commonality of purpose.  EU expert Helen Wallace 
states, “For some time, networks have been a preferred way of describing the character of 
decision-making and policy development in the EU,” referencing Héritier and Peterson in 
this regard.
ii  Reflecting on the work of Markens Jachtenfuchs, Wallace makes the 
following observation, 
 
European governance is a more fluid and malleable set of ways in which 
governments in the regular meaning of the term—from the participating 
countries interact with a wide variety of political, societal, and economic 
actors to respond to pressures and demands for public policy and for 
political aggregation or arbitration.
iii
       
  Another quality of the EU network is that it is expansionary.  Traditionally, when 
countries have operated in an expansionary mode, they have used their military strength 
to conquer territory or to influence other countries to acquiesce in their policies.  The EU, 
a late-comer militarily, has gone about it differently, utilizing an approach which is now 
recognized as “soft power” based on the seminal work of Nye.
iv  The EU uses methods 
that are designed more “to attract” than to punish or threaten.  It has adopted the posture 
of a role model in its oft-stated adherence to international norms and law.  The capacity 
of the EU to conduct effectively “soft power” is large; it matches the criteria Nye 
considers advantageous in mustering soft power.  Nye remarks the countries with most 
capacity are “those with multiple channels of communication,” “whose dominant culture 
and ideas are closer to prevailing norms,” and “whose credibility is enhanced by their 
domestic and international values and policies.” 
  Supranationalism is also a quality that enables complex interactions on the part of 
the EU.  Supranationalism in the EU, not only has provided the member governments 
with more capacity for common decision-making and action, but according to Mark 
Leonard, has increased their power in a transformative fashion.  Instead of wielding the 
power of “spectacle”, in reference to the power the United States pursues, they now wield 
the power of “surveillance”.
v  Leonard refers to the EU regulatory and legal regimes that 
determine the behavior of citizens in Europe.  He continues, “Europeans understand that 
the key to their success is the fact that their surveillance is voluntary and mutual.”
vi  It is 
also subject to the rule of law, understood in both European and American legal traditions 
as law that is known to the public and applied equally.  Whereas temptation in the War on 
Terror is to resort to secrecy so that we do not alert terrorist to our plans and to make extraordinary laws for our enemies, the strength of the surveillance society is that citizens 
understand and recognize the need for rules and participate in ordering their societies 
while believing that the great hope is that the rule of law is applied universally. 
The rule-bound regime that the EU has used in countering terror financing, that 
incorporates international institutions, the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee 
and the Financial Action Task Force, has had its share of successes.  Although the 
negotiations that precede regulations in the EU are difficult and can be protracted, once in 
place, they are enacted by 27 countries.  They have “automaticity”, as they do not require 
national implementing legislation, and they have legal authority and all that implies, 
especially democratic legitimacy.
vii  Supranationalism to the extent it provides 
surveillance, not to mention how much it benefits international cooperation, may be one 
of the most constructive tools in the War on Terror, and, ironically, one of the most 
efficient owing to its legal impact. 
In summary, the European Union brings to the table a new set of tools.  No longer 
content to serve only the role of force multipliers, they serve as multipliers of 
intelligence, state capacity (especially through the specialized Council of Ministers and 
Commission) and relations through the geographic reach enlargement has brought.  
Europeans have pioneered a new form of international cooperation, that of supranational 
cooperation, that provides legal authority and the power of surveillance.  In short, they 
have created a network that presents an incomparable set of relations for prosecuting 
terror and other transnational crimes that foster insecurity. 
 
Flexibility: Coalitions of the Willing and Committees of the Willing 
 
  Complexity has to be managed, and flexibility presents a reasonable way in which 
to bring organization to otherwise unwieldy processes.  The argument against 
“flexibility”, in terms of enlisting coalitions of EU actors that change based upon the 
issue and members’ willingness to serve, has often centered on the small countries.  As it 
goes, small countries are suspicious of a directoire, especially if is consists of Germany 
and France.  As important, opposition to a directoire stemmed from concerns that the 
“directors” possessed the power to dominate the others and would be tempted to use that 
power.  There was also the fear that France and Germany could drag the other EU 
members into situations that put them in danger or, at least, entangle them in ways they 
did not choose. 
  At a time when U.S. power in the world was trusted as protection for the weak, 
smaller countries preferred to throw their lot in with the United States as opposed to 
France or Germany.  In reference to the possible development of European defense 
capacities in the early 1960s, Buchan states, 
 
But the smaller states will be unhappy if such a development means 
precluding the direct contact of European governments with the source of 
virtually all Western strategic power, the United States.
viii
     
  The bases for this seemingly eternal argument have shifted with successive 
enlargements.  As a result, the foreign policy interests of EU countries are more diverse, 
the result of new geographic linkages.  The EU has become a much more multi-polar organization than it was previously.  The constellation of power in the Union presents 
many more possibilities of groupings.  For example, EU3 (adding Britain) has become a 
regular feature of EU diplomacy with Iran.  Ironically, the EU supports that diplomacy 
because it does not want the United States to unleash its strategic power against Iran.  
The politics in the EU have changed so much with the unilateral turn and militant posture 
of the United States under the Bush administration that most European countries, 
especially small ones, no longer maintain expectations of being able to influence the only 
superpower.  According to Josef Joffee, 
 
Singular power [that of the United States], especially power liberally used, 
transformed a festering resentment into an epidemic, and so the anti-
American obsession that swept the world contained an at least 
semirational nucleus—the fear of a giant no longer trammelled by another 
superpower.
ix    
 
 
When friends of America intend to send a warning about France and Germany 
wanting to “counteract” U.S. power, many Europeans take it as wishful thinking.  The 
Europeans are not alone in believing the U.S. does not represent their interests.  Joffee 
believes that “power unbound” in the case of the United States gives the reason “why 50-
73 percent of the people in NATO countries prefer more independence from the United 
States, why even larger majorities throughout the world (from 58 percent to 85) don’t 
want the United States to remain the one and only superpower.
x  
  It makes sense that in this climate of insecurity about U.S. actions, the EU 
is seeking ways to assert its power.  Flexibility provides the “toolbox” for the EU 
approach, to enlist an American term that has irritated Europeans in their relations with 
the United States in NATO.  Javier Solana expressed this irritation when he commented 
that Europeans would prefer to be “partners” with the United States rather than “tools”.  
Of course, Europeans would also prefer to be partners with tools. 
  Flexibility leaves options open for the EU.  Some observers will regret the 
“looseness” of these arrangements, resurrecting the arguments made against the United 
States’ decision to go to Iraq with a “coalition of the willing” instead of relying on the 
tried and true arrangements of NATO.  However, technically speaking, it seems the EU 
has a range of options with flexibility, from “committees of the willing” to “coalitions of 
the willing.”  Those actions that are taken in the context of the EU, comprised exclusively 
of EU members, and subject to the institutional constraints are not properly thought of as 
“coalitions”.  They are committees, in the sense of cabinet committees in member 
countries since they share the same values (ideally that will be enshrined in a 
Constitution) and are governed by the same institutions.  However, extending cooperation 
beyond the EU is also an attractive option, enlisting like-minded countries in an action, 
especially those countries that want to join eventually the EU or are linked to the EU 
through other sets of arrangements.  
 Flexibility also enables the EU to link up with international organizations.  The 
EUFOR intervention in the Congo in 2006 occurred on the basis of a UN request to assist 
security during an electoral process.  The UN already had peacekeepers in the field, 
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)  In reporting to the UN Security Council, French Representative Olivier 
Lacroix said “the deployment in 2006 of a new European Union-led force had been a 
major development for the Union in securing its defence policy.”
xi  The EU intervention 
in Lebanon followed a similar “flexible” pattern.  According to Sven Biscop,  
 
In spite of the troops wearing the blue helmet, UNIFIL-plus is thus clearly 
seen as an EU presence, by all relevant parties, and with all the 
implications that carries for the EU.  The Council conclusions themselves 
state this clearly: “The significant overall contribution of the Member 
States to UNIFIL demonstrates that the European Union is living up to its 
responsibilities.
xii  
 
Responsibility and Transparency 
 
  As the United States grapples with the prospect of failure in Iraq resting squarely 
on its shoulders, unable politically to extricate its troops, U.S. officials can only imagine 
a situation that they could look elsewhere to spread the blame (and to assist an exit).  As 
the EU plays its part in trying to find solutions in the Middle East, EU officials can only 
imagine that they have shouldered their responsibilities.  The United Sates sees itself 
compensating for the laxity and irresponsibility of its allies.  The EU sees itself trying to 
exert damage control over the fall-out from the gross and tragic over-stretch of the United 
States.  The worst indictment on both powers is that they have failed to make cooperation 
the standard in a world that grows more complex and dangerous by the day. 
  The EU’s identity is especially underdeveloped in the context of transatlantic 
relations.  This situation is partly owing to the refusal of the United Sates to admit the EU 
as a significant international actor.  The EU as a “flexible” actor is too often 
misapprehended by U.S. officials as a non-actor.  The cumulative identity of the EU is 
difficult to grasp.  One must take into account the multiple contexts in which EU 
countries conduct their foreign and security policies in order to assess fairly the 
cumulative identity.   
  The identity problem of the EU, especially in transatlantic relations, is also partly 
intentional.  Member countries tread lightly where the United States is concerned.  They 
parse their words in diplomatic speak.  They do not often want to make their 
disagreements known.  Therefore, it is not always possible for outside observers, even 
citizens of the EU, to know where the EU stands in relation to the United States. 
  By an account, the EU has been late to take responsibility for international 
security issues, therefore, inviting the kind of criticism in Robert Kagan’s work.  Kagan 
makes an argument which Americans often make amongst themselves: that Europeans do 
not want to pay the price, whether in blood or treasure, for global security.
xiii  T h i s 
argument stems from the burden-sharing debates in NATO throughout the 1960s and 
1970s and this century’s version of the dispute, over increasing spending for modernizing 
militaries.  It continued over Iraq with Europeans not rallying to the cause.  It is hard to 
convince Americans that Europeans choose not to invest in things military because they 
are in the process of rethinking military-based power, especially if they really do not 
believe this themselves. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is a key step in making the EU a 
responsible international actor.  It is a strikingly transparent document and, in this, 
different from other statements artfully crafted to be open to interpretation and not to 
offend.  According to Lebl, 
 
EU  documents are well-known for their bureaucratic density and lack of 
public appeal, but this text is clear and direct and provides for the first 
time a “vision” of EU strategic policy.  It identifies terrorism, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states (e.g., 
Afghansitan, Sudan or Somalia), and organized crime as the key security 
threats facing all the member states.
xiv
  
Whether the world is complex or dangerous, or both, ambiguity can no longer be 
the path forward for the EU.  The public can only be mobilized around a policy that is 
comprehensible and transparent to them.  They have repeatedly demonstrated in polling 
that they support the development of European foreign and defense policies.   As 
important, it is not secret that the bureaucratic EU needs to find ways to appeal to the 
European public.  Menand makes an important point: 
 
Ambiguity is thus harmful in and of itself.  More specifically, one of its 
by-products has been a tendency on the part of some Europeans to play 
fast and loose with their rhetoric concerning the EU’s security aspirations. 
 
When the United States asks the EU to be responsible, it has specific military-
related tasks in mind.  However, the “responsibility” the EU seems willing to assume so 
far seems to be a very different kind of responsibility, that of finding alternatives to using 
force to solve global problems and pursuing security on new levels, for example, 
addressing the roots of conflict and protecting the environment.  The EU not only 
conceives of security in novel ways but it pursues security using non-traditional means, 
most notably that of supranationalism.  Its challenge is to continue to articulate its policy, 
to publicly (and diplomatically) confront differences with others, including the United 
States, and to debate where it has failed to take responsibility.  It is not enough for the EU 
to be identified with a passive role, that it has refused to develop into a military power 
rejecting the traditional “great power” role.  The cynical view is that the passivity of the 
EU has reinforced a dynamic in transatlantic relations that encourages the United States 
to take charge to fill the gap.  Developing a new paradigm with the goal of transforming 
international relations is a future-oriented project and a worthy project.  However, it 
should not be seen as more important than finding immediate ways to address 
contemporary security issues and crises.  Inis Claude famously said of “national 
sovereignty” that it was the doctrine of irresponsibility.  Europeans must be sure that is 
not also the case with “pooling sovereignty”, or else the hope of their potentially 
transformative project is lost. 
 
 
Please take note this is a draft and is intended to be used for discussion purposes only and 
not for citation.  
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